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Abstract
We present AdversariaLib, an open-source python library for the security evaluation of
machine learning (ML) against carefully-targeted attacks. It supports the implementation
of several attacks proposed thus far in the literature of adversarial learning, allows for the
evaluation of a wide range of ML algorithms, runs on multiple platforms, and has multi-
processing enabled. The library has a modular architecture that makes it easy to use and
to extend by implementing novel attacks and countermeasures. It relies on other widely-
used open-source ML libraries, including scikit-learn and FANN. Classification algorithms
are implemented and optimized in C/C++, allowing for a fast evaluation of the simulated
attacks. The package is distributed under the GNU General Public License v3, and it is
available for download at http://sourceforge.net/projects/adversarialib.
Keywords: adversarial learning, security evaluation, evasion attacks
1. Introduction
Machine learning algorithms have been increasingly adopted in security applications like
spam, intrusion and malware detection, mainly due to their ability to generalize, i.e., to
potentially detect novel attacks or variants of known ones. However, in adversarial settings
such as the aforementioned ones, the underlying assumption of data stationarity, i.e., that
both training and test data are drawn from the same (though possibly unknown) distri-
bution, is often violated by intelligent and adaptive adversaries that purposely manipulate
data to compromise learning. This has recently raised the issue of evaluating the security
of learning algorithms to carefully-targeted attacks, besides designing suitable countermea-
sures, as pointed out in the growing research area of adversarial machine learning (Barreno
et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2011; Biggio et al., 2014).
In this work we present AdversariaLib, an open-source python library that can be
exploited to this end. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first open-source library
that implements the process of security evaluation recently advocated by Biggio et al.
(2014). The idea behind a security evaluation is to proactively anticipate the behavior of
the adversary to identify potential vulnerabilities of machine learning algorithms, and to
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design suitable countermeasures, before the corresponding attacks may actually occur. To
this end, potential attacks against the given classifier are simulated according to a given
adversary’s model through an ad hoc manipulation of training and test data, and then their
impact on the targeted classifier’s performance is evaluated. The core of this procedure
is clearly the way in which the training and the test data are modified, depending on the
considered attack. For instance, in the evasion setting, the adversary can only manipulate
malicious samples (e.g., spam emails) at test time to evade detection, while training data
remains unchanged. How each sample is manipulated depends on specific assumptions
made on the adversary’s model, i.e., on her goal, knowledge of the attacked system, and
capabilities of manipulating the data (Biggio et al., 2014, 2013). It is thus clear that the
attack strongly depends on the targeted classifier. In practice, however, only rarely the
adversary may know the targeted classifier completely: although she may realistically know
the kind of algorithm used, she may not know the parameters learned after training (e.g.,
the weights assigned to each feature by a linear classifier).
Another interesting feature of AdversariaLib is indeed the possibility of learning an
estimate of the targeted classifier, which we refer to as surrogate classifier. This assumes
that the adversary can collect a set of surrogate training data, ideally drawn from the same
distribution as the targeted classifier’s training set, retrieve the labels assigned to them by
the targeted classifier, and learn a surrogate classifier on such data. In Biggio et al. (2013)
we showed that attacking a surrogate classifier learned on a relatively small training set
may lead to evade the targeted classifier with high probability. This is an example of how
machine learning can be offensively exploited to defeat machine learning-based defenses.
AdversariaLib natively implements this mechanism to simulate realistic attacks in which
the adversary has limited knowledge of the attacked system.
We present the library’s architecture and implementation in Sect. 2, as well as an attack
example in Sect. 3. Conclusions and future extensions are discussed in Sect. 4.
2. AdversariaLib: architecture and implementation
AdversariaLib, as shown in Fig. 1, is structured into three main modules. The first,
advlib, implements the attack algorithms and functions for the evaluation of classifiers
under attack. The second, prlib, implements standard functions for handling datasets,
defining distances between samples in feature space, learning classifiers, and evaluating
their performance. To this end, prlib implements suitable wrappers that exploit other
open-source libraries, such as scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011) and FANN.1 The third,
util, contains library functions for storing datasets, classifiers, and results in the filesystem,
and for logging the progress of current experiments (on the standard output).
The library’s main script, named runexp, implements a rather general experimental
scheme that can be used to evaluate the security of different machine learning algorithms
against several kinds of adversarial attacks. In particular, it executes the following steps: (i)
randomly split data into training-test pairs (if such pairs are not given initially); (ii) for each
training portion, learn the corresponding classifier(s); (iii) attack each learned classifier; and
(iv) store the results. Any experiment is executed according to the parameters specified
1. FANN is an open-source C library for learning Fast Artificial Neural Networks (not natively supported
by scikit-learn), available at http://leenissen.dk/fann/wp/.
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Figure 1: Architecture and main components of AdversariaLib.
in the setup file, such as, e.g., number of training-test pairs, type and parameters of each
targeted classifier, and type and parameters of the chosen attack(s). It is possible to run
different experiments through the proper definition of different setup files. Experimental
results are saved according to the format defined in the util module, and depending on the
given attack. AdversariaLib also provides a set of API scripts to run simple experiments,
such as training a classifier, attacking it, and evaluating its classification accuracy.
Implementation. AdversariaLib, as well as its dependencies (third-party libraries) is
fully open-source, multi-platform, and can be used flawlessly in all major operating systems,
since it is written mainly in Python. An important aspect is that Python allows researchers
to easily and quickly implement new functionalities, and has a huge developers community.
Moreover, an in-depth code optimization can be easily achieved exploiting C/C++ language
bindings for Python, as performed by the external libraries scikit-learn and FANN. We
carefully documented the whole library, with an extensive set of usage examples, as described
in the official website http://comsec.diee.unica.it/adversarialib. We also provided
a detailed documentation on how to implement and add new attacks to the library, to make
it easy to extend. Each attack implementation must provide a simple, general interface,
and the related files must be put in a separate folder within the advlib module (see Fig. 1).
FANN and Matlab wrappers. We implemented a scikit-learn wrapper for FANN
classifiers (see prlib/classifier/mlp.py). Following the same approach, novel classifiers,
e.g., learning algorithms robust to adversarial attacks, can be easily added to the library.
We also provide an open-source wrapper that allows us to configure and run experiments
using AdversariaLib directly from the Matlab environment. In addition, the corresponding
results can be exported as PDF files. This wrapper relies on the APIs of AdversariaLib, and
can thus easily execute the evasion attack described by Biggio et al. (2013). An example
is presented in the next section. This wrapper is freely downloadable from the official
AdversariaLib repository.
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Figure 2: Gradient-based evasion of a linear SVM trained on handwritten digits.
3. Attack example on handwritten digit recognition
We report here a simple example to visually demonstrate the effectiveness of a gradient-
based evasion attack, adapted from our recent work in Biggio et al. (2013). This example
can be run using the Matlab wrapper of AdversariaLib and, in particular, the script
main_mnist.m. A linear SVM is first trained to discriminate between two classes of hand-
written digits from the MNIST dataset (LeCun et al., 1995), i.e., 3 (positive class) and
7 (negative class), and then, the former is manipulated to evade detection. The attack
iteratively modifies the initial 3 to minimize the SVM’s discriminant function g(x) through
gradient descent. Results are shown in Fig. 2. The leftmost 3 represents the initial, non-
manipulated attack sample. The second and third depicted digits represent evasion points,
i.e., manipulated 3s that are misclassified as 7, respectively as soon as the SVM’s discrim-
inant function g(x) becomes non-positive (i.e., the first found evasion point during the
descent), and after more iterations. This example not only highlights that few manipula-
tions are required to the initial 3 to be misclassified as 7, but also that they are not even
required to mimic the targeted class (the manipulated 3s evade detection without resembling
a 7 at all). This confirms the vulnerability of standard learning algorithms to well-crafted
attacks, and the need for more secure learning algorithms, as suggested by Barreno et al.
(2006); Huang et al. (2011); Biggio et al. (2014).
4. Conclusions and future work
AdversariaLib is the first open-source library for the security evaluation of machine learn-
ing against carefully targeted-attacks. Currently, it implements the gradient-based evasion
attack described in Biggio et al. (2013). As the library is modular and easy to extend, novel
and more sophisticated attacks can be easily implemented, like poisoning (Biggio et al.,
2012; Kloft and Laskov, 2010), as well as countermeasures and secure classifiers, hopefully,
with the help of an emerging community of users and developers.
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